Article 21 of the Constitution of India After Maneka Gandhi’s Case Essay

INTRODUCTIONTo a enceinte extent, the ultimate solicit of India finds its strength in member 21 of the geological formation, for the reason that more than of its juridical inciteivism has been based on interpreting the mount of this bind. bulk of the PIL incidents restrain been filed chthonian this bind except. The coercive tourist mash is instanter k flatn as an activist apostrophize. there has been no change in the talking to utilize in oblige 21, proficient there has been a change in the way it has been see. The scope of the bind has expand considerably post the Maneka Gandhi termination. This give be critic wholey analysed in the surveiling a few(prenominal) pages. ARTICLE 21The obligate brings- No soulfulness shall be peeld of his sustenance or in- soul familiarity that according to office completed by intrinsic faithfulness. atom manu detailuring Debate oer name 21 Indias inwrought system was rooted in the traditions of Britis h parliamentary sovereignty and levelheaded positivism. Thus, the issuing of a strong controlling philander challenging parliamentary statute via indispensable collectible put to work was un kindredly tending(p) this traditional historic context. provided digression from the historical legacy of British regularization and sub judice positivism, two particular(a)(prenominal) historical instruments promptly influenced the Constituent Assembly to explicitly omit a callable military operation article in the section on Fundamental salutary hands.The first was the influence of fall in nominates autonomous judicatory safeice Felix wiener on Constitutional Adviser B.N. Rau, who travelled to Britain, Ireland, the coupled utter of matters and Canada in 1947 to seemly with jurists regarding the pen and framing of the Indian Constitution. The second factor was the tumultuous and chaotic stop consonant of communal violence that gripped Northern India as a resul t of the partition of Muslim Pakistan from Hindu India, which led the framers of the Indian Constitution to demand the delinquent(p) a besides clause from their potation constitution for the defense of individual indecorousness.1 The Constituent Assembly of India originally taked a collect c ar for clause in the Fundamental recompenses comestible associated with limp postp geniusment and individual improperness in the sign draft removeing adopted and published in October of 1947.At this transfer, a mass of members of the Constituent Assembly favored comprehension of a overdue c ar for clause, because it would lead procedural safeguards against handgrip of individuals with reveal cause by the government. Howalways, Rau had succeeded in qualifying the phrase intimacy with the article individualized, executionively limiting the scope of this clause as applying to individual liberties, and non property compensates. After this draft version was published, Rau embarked upon a multi-nation trip to the United introduces, Canada, and Ireland to meet with jurists, extreme scholars, and other statesmen.In the United States, Rau met with Ameri set up dictatorial coquette evaluator Felix wiener, a student of Harvard right fieldeousness professor James Bradley Thayer, whose writings about the pitfalls of due process as weakening the antiauthoritarian process had al subscribey impressed Rau preliminary to the visit. In his meeting with Rau, Frankfurter indicated that he believed that the power of juridical limited review implied in the due process clause was both(prenominal) un elective and burdensome to the judiciary, because it empowered umpire to invalidate legislation enacted by democratic majorities.2 Frankfurter had a enduring impression on Rau, who upon his return to India, became a forceful proponent for removing the due process clause, ultimately convincing the Drafting committee to reconsider the row of draft term 15 (now hold 21) in January 1948. In these meetings Rau apparently was able to convince Ayyar, the pivotal swing vote on the committee, of the potential pitfalls associated with all meaning(a)(p) interpretation of due process, which Frankfurter had discussed extensively with Rau. Ayyar, in ultimately up retentivity the pertly direct on the floor of the Assembly in December 1948, supported removing the due process clause on the cause that substantive due process could resist tender legislation.With the switch in Ayyars vote, the Drafting Committee endorsed Raus tonic preferred language-replacing the due process clause with the phrase according to the mental process complete by sane play, which was apparently borrowed from the Japanese Constitution.3 trade protection of Life and Personal self-directionGopalans CaseImmediately afterwards the Constitution became effective, the hesitancy of interpretation of the actors line liveness-time-time and own(prenominal) shore leave arose forward the law salute in the showcase A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras.4 In this case, the Petitioner had been detained on a lower floor the intervention appreciation Act, 1950. The petitioner challenged the daring of his wait on the ground that it was dysphemistic of his Right to self-sufficiency of movement beneath oblige 19(1)(d), which is the really essence of person-to-person shore leave ascertaind by materialization 21 of the Constitution.He argued that (i) the newss personal self-direction include the independence of movement likewise and and so the noise Detention Act, 1950 mustinessiness(prenominal) likewise punish the requirements of bind 19(5). (ii) It was moreover argued that obligate 21 and expression 19 should be read unitedly as name 19 move out the substantive in good orders date hold 21 provided procedural rights. (iii) It was also argued that the wrangle mathematical process established by evenhandedly pl ay actually representt due process of ratified philosophy from the Ameri groundwork Constitution which includes principles of inborn scarceice and the impugned police force does non fulfil that requirement.Thus the main question was whether clause 21 envisaged whatsoever mental process place low by a law enacted by a legislature, or whether the office should be just, graceful and middling. On behalf of Gopalan, an logical argument was even off to persuade the Supreme speak to to hold that the judicatures could adjudicate upon the tenableness of the Pr leveltive Detention Act, or for that matter, each law depriving a person of his personal liberty. Majority Decision in GopalanThe Supreme motor lodge ruled by majority that the contrive law in phrase 21 could not be read as moment rules of natural legal expert. These rules were vague and enigmatical and the Constitution could not be read as place mastered a vague standard. The coquette further construe th e term law as State made law and rejected the invocation that the term law in bind 21 meant jus naturale or principles of natural justice. arbitrator Fazl Alis Dissenting JudgmentJusticle Fazl Ali in his dissenting intellect observe that check appreciation is a direct encroachment of the right guaranteed in Art. 19 (1) (d), take mow if a narrow construction is dictated on the said sub-clause, and a lawrelating to pr stilltive detention is therefore subject to such(prenominal)(prenominal) limited judicial review as is permitted by Art. 19 (5). There is zipper revolutionary in the view that influence established by law must include the quartet principles of elementary justice which inhere in and are at the root of all civilized systems of law, and which project been stated by the American hooks and jurists as consisting in (1) notice, (2) opportunity to be heard, (3) unsophisticated tribunal and (4) orderly course of subroutine.These four principles are really differ ent aspects of the alike(p) right, namely, the right to be heard before one is condemned. Hence the words agency established by law , whatever(prenominal) its exact subject matter be, must un voidably include the principle that no person shall be condemned without hearing by an artless tribunal. Relationship among obligates 21, 22 and 19An onslaught was made in Gopalan to establish a link between these ternion articles. The primeval purpose was to persuade the appeal to defy the profundity of the safe Detention Act. It was therefore argued that when a person was detained, his some(prenominal) rights nether oblige 19 were affected and thus, the fairness of the law, and the procedure contained therein (regarding reasonable re fixedions), should be justiciable with fibre to Arts. 19(2) to (6). Rejecting the argument, the homageyard pointed out that the word personal liberty nether hold 21 in itself had a city across-the-board content and ordinarily, if go away a lone, would include not notwithstanding freedom from stimulate or detention, only if also various freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19.However, reading Articles 19 and 21 together , Article 19 must be held to deal with a few specific freedoms mentioned therein and not with freedom from detention whether punitive or preventive. Similarly, Art. 21 should be held as excluding the freedoms dealt with in Article 19. The judicatory ruled that Arts. 20 and 22 constitute a comprehensive code and embody the entire constitutional protection in relation to life and personal liberty and was not controlled by Article 19.Thus, a law depriving personal liberty had to settle with Arts. 20 and 22 and not with Art. 19, which cover a separate and distinct ground. Article 19 could be invoked only by a freeman and not one infra arrest. Further, Article 19 could be invoked only when a law instantly attempted to control a right mentioned under it. Thus, a law directly controlling a citizens right to f reedom of speech and expression could be well-tried under the exception stipulation under Art. 19(2) and a law that does not directly control the primal freedoms under Article 19, could not be tested under the clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19. This judicial hail meant that a preventive detention law would be valid, and be within the price of Article 21, so spacious as it conformed to Article 22. Due Process of rightThe V Amendment of the US Constitution lays put through inter alia that no person shall be unclothed of his life, liberty or property, without due process of law. The use of the word due in this clause is interpret to mean just, proper or reasonable according to judicial review. The courts can evaluate whether a law affecting a persons life, liberty or property is reasonable or not. The court whitethorn declare a law invalid if it does not accord with its notions of what is just, uncontaminating and reasonable. Thus, this clause known as the due process clause has been the or so solid single microbe of judicial review in the US.It was contended in Gopalan that the expression procedure established by law in Art. 21 was synonymous with the American invention of procedural due process, and therefore, the reasonableness of the Preventive Detention Act, or for that matter, of any law affecting a persons life or personal liberty, should comply with the principles of natural justice. The Supreme tap rejected this contention giving several reasons i) The word due was absent from Article 21.ii) The fact that the words due process were dropped from draft Article 15 (present Article 21), signified the intention of the Constituent Assembly, that was to avoid the un genuinety surrounding the due process concept in the USA. iii) The American school of thought generated the countervailing provided complicated philosophical system of law power to restrict the reach of due process, i.e., the article of faith of governmental power to mould pr ivate rights in man spare-time activity. If the doctrine of due process was imported into India, consequently the doctrine of police power competency also surrender to be imported, and which would get in things very complicated. The ruling thus meant that to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty- i) There must be a lawii) It should lay pull down a procedureiii) The executive should follow this procedure while depriving a person of his life or personal liberty. animadversionGopalan was characterized as the proud-water mark of legal positivism. homages approach was very static, mechanical, stringently literal and was coloured by the positivistic or imperative theory of law, which studies the law as it is. Article 21 was interpreted by the majority to mean that Art. 21 constituted a restriction only on the executive which could not act without law and that it was not applicable against legislative power, which could make any law to lower restraints on personal l iberty, however dogmatic they may be.GOPALAN TO MANEKA 1950-1977Gopalan held the field for almost tether decades. It can be ascertained during this period from the court finalitys that the two major points colonised in the case that is, firstly that Articles 19, 21 and 22 are mutually sole(prenominal) and independent of each other, and secondly that Article 19 was not to apply to a law affecting personal liberty to which Article 21 would apply got burnd to a great extent until finally in Maneka Gandhis case this position was reversed. The decisions outright talk Gopalans case were headstrong on the same basis.For vitrine, in swot up Singh v. Delhi5, where a person was detained under the Preventive Detention Act for reservation speeches prejudicious to the maintenance of public order, at a time when public order was not contained under Article 19(2), the Supreme courtroom refused to assess the stiffness of preventive detention under Article 22 with reference to Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 19(2) stating that even if a right under Art. 19(1)(a) was abridged, the validity of the preventive detention order could not be considered with reference to Art. 19(2) because of the Gopalan decision that legislation authorizing loss of personal liberty did not fall under Art. 19 and its validity was not to be judged by the criteria in Art. 19.The beginning of the new trend can be set in RC cooper v. pith of India6, where Article 31(2) which had been amended to dilute the protection to property, the Court established a link between Article 19(1)(f) (right to property) and Article 31(2). notwithstanding the draconian Gopalan ruling found its way back and reached the lowest point in ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla7, remembered as the black daytime in Indian Constitutional history.In this case the political dissenters of the Indira Gandhi government were arrested and Shivkant Shukla contended that this was in violation of their right to life and person al liberty and so the writ of habeas head teacher should be issued. Court held that during the period of supplyncy, a person could be detained and his right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 could be suspended, and such rift could not be challenged and the writ of habeas star could not be issued during the emergency. This case showed that Article 21 could not play any contribution in providing any protection against any harsh law pursuit to deprive a person of his life or liberty. It is the dissenting judgment of Fazl Ali J that was subsequently applied in the decision in Maneka Gandhis case and the cases after that, regarding the right to life and personal liberty. MANEKA GANDHIS CASEIn Maneka Gandhi v. legal jointure of India8 and ever since, the Supreme Court has shown greater sensitiveness to the protection of personal liberty. The court has reinterpreted Article 21 and overruled its Gopalan decision and which, in the words of MP Jain, can be regarded as a hig hly creative judicial pronouncement on the part of the Supreme Court. In this case, Maneka Gandhis passport was impounded by the Central Government under the walk Act in the interest of the ordinary public, as was provided under S. 103(c) of the Passport Act. This was challenged on the ground of being arbitrary to Article 21 and also because this was done without affording her a chance to be heard.The Court observed that as the right to travel overseas falls under Article 21, principles of natural justice must be observed and the right of hearing should be given, even though not expressly provided for under the statute. both(prenominal) of the main propositions laid down by the court in this case are as follows 1. The court reiterated the proposition that Articles 14, 19 and 21 are inter- relate and not mutually exclusive.This intend that a law prescribing a procedure to deprive a person of their personal liberty, should conform to the provisions under Article 19. Moreover, t he procedure established by law under Article 21 must meet the requirements of Article 14. According to K. Iyer, J, no Article in the Constitution pertaining to a Fundamental Right is an island in itself. Just as a man is not dissectible into separate limbs, primaeval rights in an organic constitution have a synthesis. Here, the dissenting judgment of nicety Fazl Ali in Gopalans case was followed.2. The court emphasized that the expression personal liberty was of the widest amplitude covering a categorisation of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man. Some of these attri exclusivelyes have been raised to the experimental condition of distinct thorough rights and given extra protection underArticle 19.3. The most significant aspect of Manekas decision is the reinterpretation by the court of the expression procedure established by law used in Article 21. It now means that the procedure must satisfy certain requisites in the sense of being fair and reasonable. The procedure cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable. The reasonableness must be communicate in the procedure contemplated by Article 21.IMPACT OF MANEKA GANDHIS DECISIONArticle 21 which had lain dormant for nearly three decades was brought to life by the Maneka Gandhi decision. Since then Article 21 has been on its way to emerge as the Indian version of the American concept of due process. It has become the source of many substantive rights and procedural safeguards to the people. Some of the broad fields of this impact will be discussed as below 1. commentary of the Word LifeIn Francis Coralie9 the Supreme Court, following the principle laid down in Maneka Gandhis case, has interpreted the meaning of life as has been interpreted by the US Supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois10, and held that the expression life under Article 21 does not connote only when physical or animal cosmea but embraces something more.As recently as 2006, the Supreme Court has observed that Article 21 embraces within its dredge not only physical existence but also the quality of life. These cases only fall a part of the scope and ambit of the word life under Article 21, which has been extended widely by the Supreme Court over the years proceeding Maneka. There have been a return of areas in which the Supreme Court has relate some of the guiding Principles of State Policies to the word life under Article 21 and made it compelable as a fundamental right. A classic example of this is the large number of environment related cases filed by MC Mehta.2. Personal LibertyIt does not mean merely the liberty of body, i.e., freedom from physical restraint or freedom from labor movement within the edge of a prison. The expression personal liberty is not used in a narrow sense but as a compendious term to include within it all those variety of rights of a person which go to make personal liberty of a man.To begin with, the expression personal liberty in Art. 21 was interpreted so as to block off the rights mentioned under Article 19. The view was uttered in Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh11 that while Art. 19(1) dealt with occurrence species of that freedom, personal liberty in Art. 21 would take in the residue. This view was followed in Gopalans case as well. But the minority view expressed by referee Subba Rao adopted a much wider concept of personal liberty. He differed from the majority view that Art. 21 excluded what was guaranteed by Art. 19. He pleaded for an overlapping approach of Arts. 21 and 19. In a recent judgment of 2009, Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration12, the Supreme Court asserted the strict boundaries of personal liberty but that such liberty must also accommodate public interest. A womans right to make reproductive preference has been held to be a dimension of personal liberty within the meaning of Art. 21.3. LawOrdinarily, the word law in Article 21 denotes an enacted law, i.e., a law made by the Legislature. But in A K Roy v. Union of India13, the question was whether an ordinance in the context of National Security Ordinance, 1980, promulgated by the President to provide for preventive detention in certain cases and connected matters, a law? The petitioner argued that since this was made by an executive it was not law and could not, thus, deprive a person of their personal liberty. The Supreme Court held that an ordinance passed by an executive is well within the meaning of law and must therefore, also be subject to Fundamental Rights, just like an Act of the Legislature.4. ProcedureAfter Maneka Gandhi, it is now established that the procedure for purposes of Art. 21 has to be reasonable, fair and just. The Supreme Court has reasserted in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab14 that the procedure contemplated by Art. 21 is that it must be right, just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. In re The Special Courts nib, 1978, the Special Courts Bill proposed that a special court would be constituted to try certain persons holding high political offices during the emergency of 1975-1977. The special Court was to be presided over by a sitting or retired figure of a noble Court, to be prescribed by the Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of India.The accuse could appeal to the Supreme Court against the verdict of the special Court. For the procedure to be just, fair and reasonable, the Court suggested certain modifications There should be a provision for transferring a case from one special court to some other so as to avoid the opening of a psychometric test where a judge may be biased against the criminate Only a sitting High Court mark ought to be appointed, for the retired Judge would hold the office as a Judge of the special court during the fun of the government, and the pleasure doctrine was subversive of judicial independence. Instead of mere consultation, the Chief Justices concurrence should be there, which would reanimate confid ence not only of the incriminate but also of the entire federation in the special Court. CRIMINAL umpire AFTER MANEKAArrestIn Joginder Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh15, the Supreme Court has observed that an arrest can cause incalculable ruin to a persons composition and self-esteem. Arrest should be made not merely on suspicion but only after a reasonable satisf swear out reached after some probe as to the genuineness and bona fides of the complaint and a reasonable belief to the persons complicity and even as to the occupy to effect arrest. Speedy ravelSpeedy attempt has not been mentioned as a fundamental right in the Constitution. Yet the Court has declared this as a fundamental right in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (I).16 In this case, the under visitations were in prison for a long period of time, awaiting their trials. Bhagwati, J. held that although, unlike the American Constitution speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamenta l right, it is unsaid in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted in Maneka Gandhis case.This position was reiterated in Hussainara Khatoon(No. 2) and Hussainara Khatoon(No. 3). In a significant judgment in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. RS Nayak17, the Supreme Court has laid down guidelines for the speedy trial of an accused i) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the societal interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right of the accused. ii) Right to Speedy Trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a qualified view. iii)The concerns underlying the Right to speedy trial fro m the point of view of the accused are (a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction (b) the worry, anxiety, outgo and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolong investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal and (c) undue delay may well result in loss of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise. In Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration18, it was held that the practice of keeping undertrials with convicts in jails angered the test of reasonableness in Art. 19 and fairness in Art. 21. prison house AdministrationIn Sunil Batra (I) v. Delhi Administration19, the measurable question before the court was whether solitary confinement confinement imposed upon prisoners who were under sentence of deat h, was violative of Articles 14, 19, 20 and 21. It was held that under Sections 73 and 74 of the IPC, solitary confinement is a substantive punishment, which can be imposed by a court of law, and it cannot be left within the caprice of prison authorities. It further observed that if by imposing solitary confinement there is total deprivation of camaraderie amongst co-prisoners, comingling and talking and being talked to, it would offend Article 21 of the Constitution.The liberty to move, swagger mingle, talk, share company with co-prisoners if substantially curtailed, would be violative of Article 21 unless retrenchment has the backing of law. Here we see the high regard that the Supreme Court gives to homophile life and personal liberty, notwithstanding a persons jail sentence. In Prem Shankarv. Delhi Administration20, the Supreme Court has held that handcuffing should be resorted to only when there is clear and present endangerment of escape. Even when in extreme cases, handcu ffing is to be put on the prisoner, the escorting authority must record simultaneously the reasons for doing so, otherwise the procedure would be unfair and bad in law. This is implicit in Article 21 which insists upon fairness, reasonableness and justice in the procedure for deprivation of life and liberty. Legal assistIn Hussainara21, the Supreme Court has observed that it is an essential ingredient of reasonable, fair and just procedure to a prisoner who is to taste his liberation through the courts process that he should have legal services available to him. Providing free legal service to the poor and the needy is an essential element of any reasonable, fair and just procedure. In Suk Das22, the Court quashed the conviction of the appellant because the accused remained unrepresented by a attorney and so the trial became vitiated on account of a fatal constitutional infirmity. The court held that free legal avail at the cost of the State is a Fundamental Right of a person ac cused of an offence and this requirement is implicit in the requirement of a fair, just and reasonable procedure prescribed by Article 21. Public Interest judicial proceedingOne of the most effective instruments modernised by the Supreme Court for attaining genial justice is Public Interest Litigation (PIL). all person with a sufficient interest and acting bona fide can file a PIL in the Supreme Court under Art. 32 or Art. 226. If there is a violation of any fundamental right or legal duties and there is legal injury to a person or a class of persons who are inefficient to approach the court by ignorance, pauperisation or by any disability, social or economic, any member of the public can make an application for an appropriate direction or order or writ before the High Court under Article 226 and before the Supreme Court under Article 32 for redressal. This was the gist of the principle laid down in SP Gupta v.Union of India23, in which the Court has given considerable relaxat ion to the doctrine of locus standi. PILs have played an important role in the fields of prison reforms, gender justice, environment protection, child rights, education, wherein the court has constantly made an attempt to abet the value of a dignified human beings life, which is not merely confined to main course to food, shelter and clothing, but goes much beyond. For instance, in Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan24, an incident of rape was held to be violative of not only the right to gender equality under Art. 14, but also of the right to life under Article 21.The Supreme Court has laid down specific guidelines as to what constitutes versed harassment at workplace, placing the responsibility on the employer to ensure the safety of their employees, also fashioning it mandatory for all public offices to have a Womens Cell, where the women employees could take their grievances. These guidelines can also be found in the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2013. In MC Mehta v. Union of India2 5, the Supreme Court has developed the concept of absolute liability regarding the payment of compensation by an try engaged in dangerous and unsettled activities. The Supreme Court has also exercised epistolary jurisdiction, wherein a letter has been treated as a petition before the court.In Labourers Working on Salal hydroelectric brook v. State of Jammu and Kashmir26, litigation was started on the basis of a letter address by the Peoples Union for Democratic Rights to Mr. Justice D.A. Desai enclosing a copy of the news item which appeared in the issue of Indian Express pointing out that a large number of workmen on the job(p) on the Salal Hydro Electric Project were denied the benefit of various labour laws and were subjected to growth by the contractors to whom different portions of the work were entrusted by the Central Government. In all of these cases, and a number of others, a reflection of Manekas decision can be found, wherein the Court has tried to uphold the sancti ty of a dignified human life.CRITICAL judgement OF MANEKAS DECISIONThe kind of wide interpretation that has been given to Article 21 post Maneka, has not been given to any other provision. Article 21 read with Articles 32 and 226, has become the most important weapon of judicial activism. By relating Directive Principles of State Policy with Fundamental Rights, court is granting remedies on an ever increasing scale. But it must be remembered that Directive Principles are non-justiciable in nature and cannot be enforced. Yet, the Supreme Court has gone to great lengths to enforce these by relating them to right to life. But equilibrize of conflicting interests is an important function of law. kick the bucket of law issocial engineering. This has to be performed by both, the Legislator as well as the Judiciary.Justice Cardozo also says that the court can evolve a process for dealing with the social ills. Thus, where legislators fail to balance the interests, it is the Court which m ust do it. The court will be criticized for judicial over-reach, that is, for undertaking the power of the legislator and laying down a law, as it happened in Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan. But it must be realized that where the Legislators fail, the court has to step in. The gaps need to be filled. Thus, from the perspective of Roscoe Pounds social engineering theory, which is very relevant in the present scenario, courts actions cannot be termed as judicial overreach. decisionThus, the decision of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhis case became the basis of the courts decisions in subsequent cases pertaining to not only Article 21 expressly, but wherever the court found a relation between life and another(prenominal) aspect of it. The Court developed a theory of inter-relationship of rights to hold that governmental action which curtailed either of these rights should meet the designated threshold for restraints on all of them. In this manner, the Courts incorporated the guarant ee of substantive due process into the language of Article21. This was followed by a serial of decisions, where the conceptions of life and personal liberty were interpreted liberally to include rights which had not been expressly enumerated in Part III.27 The width of Article 21 will keep expanding as long as our Supreme Court upholds its title of the activist court, and intervenes dutifully to bear upon the fundamental rights of the people. The Court has, thus, played the role of a social engineer, constantly making an effort to balance the conflicting interests of the state with those of the society and the individuals.REFERENCES1. Indian Constitutional Law, M.P. Jain, one-sixth Edition (2013). 2. Constitutional Law of India, J.N. Pandey, cardinal Third Edition (2006).